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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

IN RE:

/

SERGE B. GUDMUNDSEN,

/

NO. 14580

Disciplinary Proceeding. /
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the Board of Commissioners
of the Utah State Bar seeking the imposition of disciplinary
proceedings as against the Appellant herein.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISCIPLINE
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar made
findings in violation of specific sections of the Violations
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial
Ethics by the Appellant in regards to his relationship with
the matter of Verus Thornley v. J. Christensen and the Appellant's
relationship with a client, namely Mr. and Mrs. Charles T. Hales.
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar made
recommendations to the Utah Supreme Court, that the Appellant,

Serge B. Gudmundson, be suspended from the practice of Law
until he can satisfy the Board of Commissioners of the Utah
State Bar and the Utah Supreme Court, that he is competent
to practice law in the State of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Findings of Fact
and recommendations of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah
State Bar, that Appellant be suspended from the practice of
law, and a reversal of the Findings that the conduct of the
Appellant in regards to the two matters presented before the
Board at its hearings warrant the recommendation made to this
Honorable Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The matter before the Board of Commissioners was partially
founded on Complaint made by Mr. and Mrs. Charles T. Hales
of Fielding, Utah, wherein the services of the Appellant was
retained on October 18, 1972 (TR-20), to defend the parties
on charges of drunken driving and public intoxication (TR24).

The original place of trial set for the Hales was in

Tremonton (Dep.35) and the Appellant made an appearance for the
Hales in Tremonton and obtained a Change of Venue from Tremonton
to Brigham City for the matter. (TR-35)
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Subsequently a jury trial was held in both matters in
the City Court of Brigham City, wherein Mr. Hales was acquitted
and Mrs. Hales was convicted. (TR-35)
The Appellant thereupon filed an Appeal to the District
Court in Box Elder County on behalf of~Mrs. Hales, and through
a series of postponements of the actual trial of Mrs. Hales,
the matter was subsequently dismissed through the efforts of
the Appellant. (TR-36)
The services theretofore rendered by the Appellant on
behalf of the Hales was appearance in Tremonton for Change
of Venue, then a subsequent trial for both of the individuals
before a jury in the City Court of Brigham City, and subsequently
an Appeal from the conviction of Mrs. Hales from the City Court
to the District Court with an ultimate dismissal of the matter
against Mrs. Hales. Two jury trials were held as to the two
Defendants, the Hales, in the matter wherein the Appellant
appeared for the parties. (TR-36)
The Appellant was paid the sum of $2,200.00 by the Hales
in the defense of both of the Hales of the criminal matters
brought against them and for a civil action against the police
officers who made the arrest.

Pursuit of the civil matter

was never undertaken by the Appellant. (St.Exh.l)
The Appellant admitted to the Hales and to their Attorney,
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Mr. Farr, that monies was due and owing as refund for some
of the fees paid by Hales to the Appellant, but no sum had
been worked out as to the value of services rendered by the
Appellant on behalf of the Hales. (St.Exh.l)
The matter as against Mrs* Hales was not dismissed until
September or October, 1973 (R-45), and the Hales had retained
Mr. Lionel Farr to seek a refund for them in December, 1973.
(TR-45)
Even though the Hales had retained Mr. Farr in December,
1973, to seek a refund, as late as April 29, 1974, Mr. Hales
had authorized the Appellant to pursue his civil suit, even
though he had already hired Lionel Farr to get a refund of
his fees from the Appellant. (TR-54)
In March 15, 1974, Mr. Lionel Farr was advised of the
eye surgery to be performed upon the Appellant (TR-78), and
the Appellant had not been able to practice law since April,
1974, to present date because of multiple surgical operations
on both eyes. (TR-85)

The Appellant has made a refund of fees

remaining to the Hales and a Satisfaction of Judgment has been
filed by Mr. Farr on behalf of his clients, the Hales. (Exh.A
attached)
The second matter considered by the Bar Commission was
the employment of the Appellant on September 11, 1972, to
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represent Mrs. Verus N. Thornley and her minor son on a criminal
complaint and to institute a civil suit against the complainant
neighbor. (TR-88)
The client paid a fee to the Appellant for handling
the two criminal matters and the civil matter in the sum of
$1,500.00. (TR-90)
A jury trial was held in the criminal matter concerning
Mrs. Thornley in the City Court and she was convicted of the
criminal offense. (TR-117)
A Notice and Appeal was taken in the matter from the
City Court to the District Court (TR-118) and a jury trial
was thereafter held in the District Court and Mrs. Thornley
was acquitted in that matter.
A civil suit was subsequently filed by the Appellant
on behalf of Mrs. Thornley in the District Court seeking damages
for malicious prosecution.

Appellant advised Mrs. Thornley

that he had invested hours and hours of research upon the matter
of the civil suit and that he advised Mrs. Thornley that if
she stopped the civil suitr that there would be very little
refund because of the time the Appellant had put into the case.
(TR-100)
The Deposition was taken of Mrs. Thornley, which was
attended to by the Appellant (R-119).
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The Deposition of the

complainant in the criminal matter against Mrs. Thornley/ a
Mr, Christensenf and who was also the Defendant in the civil
action was taken by the Appellant in February, 1974, with Mrs.
Thornley testifying that she was present at both instances
(TR-103).
The charge against Mrs* Thornleyfs son was dismissed
in Juvenile Court.
Mrs. Thornley testified that she was advised by the
Appellant, that the $1/500.00 which had been paid to handle
all of the matters would not result in any additional charges,
even though an Appeal to the District Court and taking of Deposition
had occurred/ and that there would be no charge of any additional
cost as to the conduct of her criminal and civil matters. (TR118)
Mrs. Thornley further testified/ that at no time did
she request an accounting from the Appellant; that she did
not have any knowledge of the research in the matter invested
by the Appellant. (TR-128)
Mrs. Thornley testified under oath/ that she did not
pay the Appellant any monies for cost of filing the Complaint
nor for taking of the Deposition and attending the other Deposition,
which was taken of Mrs. Thornley (TR-128).
-6-

The Complaint of the Board of Bar Commissioners sets
forth as an admission, that the Appellant was physically disabled
subsequently to having undertaken the matter on behalf of
Verus N. Thornley (R-4), and also subsequent to undertaking
the handling of the matter for the Hales (R-5).
The Appellant was still disabled as of December 10/ 1975
(R-7)•

The Record further shows that at the time of the hearing

in this instant matter before the Board of Bar Commissioners,
in the instant matter of the Findings of Fact and Recommendations
of the Board of Bar Commissioners as presently before this
Court, that the Appellant was unable because of his physical
disability to attend at his hearing, that he had four cateract
operations, twice on each eye, and that he could not see and
had very limited vision and could not travel to Salt Lake City
for his hearing. (TR-5)
The ruling of the Board was that the proceedings would
go forward in the matter of the discipline of the Appellant
without his presence, "That we have given as much time as we
can to Mr. Gudmundsen". (TR-6)
Counsel for Appellant entered into the Record, that in
each instance of a calling of hearing, that there was a medical
report from a doctor accompanying request for continuances (R-6),
and that the Commissioners made a record of admission of notices
-7-

from medical doctors of the requests for continuance because
of the disability of the Appellant and from letters from Counsel
for Appellant requesting such continuances reflecting the disability of the Appellant. (Dep.71
The Record before the Court from the Board of Bar
Commissioners reflected that the matter did continue and a
hearing was held without the presence of the Appellant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DUE PROCESS REQUIRES ADEQUATE HEARING.
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the
exhibits and records before this Court, including the findings
entered by the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar
evidence that the Appellant was not physically capable of being
present for his defense, in that he was suffering from physical
disability because of a multiple surgical intervention necessitated
four times upon the eyes of the Appellant (TR-5), made difficult
and almost impossible any valid defense to be presented by the
Appellant before the Board.
There was a decision by the Board of Commissioners, that
the trial of the Disciplinary Hearings as against the Appellant
would be held regardless of his presence, in that the Appellant
-8-

had Counsel present/ and it was alleged by the Board, that
an adequate defense of the Appellant could be made by Counsel
for Appellant without the necessity of his client being present.
(TR-6)
An examination of the Transcript from the Court will
evidence that the Counsel for the Appellant was indeed unable
to make an adequate defense of his client, the Appellant herein,
in that a strict interpretation of the rules of evidence was
determined to be the proper manner of proceeding by the Board
of Commissioners/ and therefore. Counsel for Appellant was
repeatedly denied opportunities to introduce matters in contradiction and mitigation of testimony of the adverse witnesses
by reason of the absence of the Appellant.
POINT II
DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEY SHOULD NOT BE PUNITIVE.
In Geer v. Stathopulos, 390 P.2d 606, Sup.Ct. of Colo.,
the Court stated:
That capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion
by the administrative Board can arise, by exercise
of its discretion in such a manner after consideration
of evidence before it, has clearly indicated that
its action was based on conclusions from the evidence
such that reasonable men fairly and honestly considering the evidence must reach contrary conclusions.
The Colorado Supreme Court further stated the abiding
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and well based principle, that when a Court is called upon to
review action of an administrative agency, it should be placed
in the same position as such agency, and therefore, if the
agency has some knowledge of some fact, and it acts upon such
knowledge, it should see to it that what it knows becomes part
of the record in order to permit the reviewing Court to evaluate
the matter so known.
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that in the
instant matter before the Court, the record as evidenced by the
transcript of the proceedings, evidences that the Board did not
desire to place into evidence all materials that would be of aid
to this Honorable Court, as the Court of ultimate authority and
the reviewing Court in such matters, so that this Court would
have before it all of the records available in the records of
the Board of Commissioners to draw its own conclusions as to
whether or not the conduct of the Appellant had been wrongful
and in violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics for which
the Appellant has been charged.
It is submitted to the Court, that the principle of law
set forth in Marks v. France, 325 P.2d 368, may be applicable in
the instant situation where the Court stated that an administrative
body, such as the Board of Examiners in Optometry, cannot be the
final judge of reasonableness of its orders, and while Courts
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will not be permitted to substitute their judgment for that of
administrative bodiesf nevertheless Courts are definitely charged
with the solemn duty of determining whether the procedure
employed in reaching judgment, or whether judgment itself as
rendered/ is unreasonable, arbitrary, or oppressive under circumstances of each particular case.
The record as to both of the complainant parties, namely
the Thornleys and the Hales, evidences a great amount of work
performed by the Attorney, the Appellant herein, and also an
attempt by the clients to establish their concept of what their
fee should be after having been cleared of all criminal charges
against them through the capability of the Appellant in handling
the defenses necessary in their actions.
The Statutes of the State of Utah at 78-51-16, Utah Code
Annotated, as amended 1953, specifically give the Appellant
as a member of the Utah State Bar the right to defend himself
by the introduction of evidence and the examination of witnesses
called against him, and that it is obviously apparent that
if the Appellant is physically unable to attend at his own
hearing and his Counsel cannot introduce, under the Rules of
Evidence established by the Board, those matters in refutation
and mitigation of the testimony of witnesses testifying against
the Appellant, then there is no way in which the Appellant
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can have been allowed his right of hearing as provided for
under this Statute.
It is further submitted to this Court, that in accordance
with 78-51-41, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1953, that the
compensation of an Attorney and Counselor for his services
is governed by agreement, expressed or implied, which is not
restrained by law.
The Appellant recognizes the rights of the Court and
Board of Commissioners to consider whether or not a charge
is so outrageous as to be in violation of the Canons of Ethics
reflecting a reasonableness of fee, but that this should not
be interpreted as taking away from an attorney the right to
recover the value of his services and be paid for his efforts
expended on behalf of clients.

The client should not be allowed

to establish what shall constitute fair compensation for an
Attorney as determined by the client after the client has been
relieved of the fear of criminal punishment by the success
of Counselor for the client in eliminating criminal charges
against the client.
In mitigation of the findings against the Appellant, it
is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the Appellant has not
been engaged in the practice of law due to his surgical interventions and physical disabilities for more then two years,
-12-

and that in accordance with the Affidavit hereto attached by
Counsel for the Appellant, there has been a satisfactory settlement as to the complainants in both the Thornley and Hales
matter as to any claim they might have for excess attorney's
fees and as set forth in Exhibit A hereto attached, which is
the Affidavit of Counsel, and is provided so that this Honorable
Court can have before it all matters necessary to consider
a just verdict as to any disciplinary action that is sought
to be imposed upon the Appellant.
CONCLUSION
It is, therefore, submitted to this Honorable Court, that
consideration should be given to the type of defense that was
afforded to the Appellant due to his physical inability to be
present at his defense and aid in his own presentation of evidence
of those testifying against him; that the Appellant has not engaged
in the practice of law for a considerable period of time and will
not be engaged in the practice of law for some period in the
future, and further, that the claims, if any, of the complainants
has been satisfied as set forth in Exhibit A hereto attached.
Respectfully submitted,

~^FETE U. VLAHOS (
^
Attorney for Appellant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
-13-

Schedule A
AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH
SS
COUNTY OF WEBER:
PETE N. VLAHOS, being first duly sworn upon his oath,
deposes and states:
That he has at all times pertinent hereto been Counsel
for Appellant, Serge B. Gudmundson, and that all claims of
Verus Thornley and Mr. and Mrs. Charles T. Hales have been paid
and an Accord and Satisfaction, together with Satisfaction of
Judgment, have been entered as to the claims of the aforesaid
parties, and that there is no indebtedness whatsoever as between
Serge B. Gudmundson and the claimants.
Further, Affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this

//

day of June, 1976.

PETE^U. VLAHO^, Afflant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
June, 1976.

^

/{

day of
i—/'-

NOTARY PUBLIC
cResiding at Ogden, Utah
My Commission Expires:
7/1/77

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
A copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was posted
in the U.S. mail postage prepaid and addressed to the Attorney
for the Respondent, P. Keith Nelson, 716 Newhouse Building, Sali
Lake City, Utah 84111, on this j j _ day of June, 1976.
<_

s/k

/Jeannme Stowell, Secretary

